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1 Introduction
The long-run real rate of interest, also known as the natural rate of interest, has been
studied by academics since Knut Wicksell introduced it in the late nineteenth century.
Although there are various denitions of this concept, the most extended is the rate
that ensures aggregate price stability and the reaching of the potential output in
the absence of exogenous shocks or, as dened by Woodford (2003), the equilibrium
real rate of return when prices are fully exible. Nevertheless, its denition and
importance have been modied over time due to the progress in the understanding
of the economy and the changes in the tools used by the monetary authorities.
The way that monetary policy is currently conducted by central banks, leaving
aside the monetary aggregates and using the nominal interest rate as the main instru-
ment, recovers a key role for the natural rate of interest. The link between monetary
policy and the natural rate of interest stems from the rules through which the macro-
economic mainstream, the New Keynesian models, considers that monetary policy is
conducted. In these models, the nominal interest rate is set by rules in which the
natural rate is the intercept and somehow characterizes the stance of the monetary
policy. In this context, it is assumed that this rate is known exactly. However, the
natural rate of interest is unobservable, so central banks must estimate it. During
this process, monetary authorities could over or infraestimate the true value. A proof
of this lack of accuracy is the gap between the observed interest rates and those that
would result from the rules, as noted by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Orphanides
(2003), who relate these gaps to the uncertainty associated with the estimation of
the unobservable variables. Therefore, a deeper analysis of the fundamentals of the
natural rate and the consequences of its incorrect estimation becomes convenient.
The academic literature has made progress in the understanding of the natural
rate of interest in the context described above. Woodford (2001) discusses the uc-
tuations of this rate and its implications for the monetary policy. He argues that
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the natural rate of interest varies across time in response to real disturbances, but
is always supposed to be accurately known. Woodford does not inquire about the
possible implications of the use of a rate di¤erent to the endogenous one. By contrast,
Orphanides and Williams (2002) consider that the estimated value introduced into
the policy rule may di¤er from the endogenous rate. They show that the cost of un-
derestimating the natural rate of interest is larger than the cost of overestimating it,
considering the consequences in terms of stabilizing the economy. Meanwhile, Tris-
tani (2009) analyzes the determinants of the natural rate of interest and also raises
the possibility that the value estimated by the monetary authority may di¤er from
the correct value. This author concludes that, if there were such a di¤erential, the
ination target would never be reached1. Moreover, even if monetary authorities were
able to know the exact law of motion of the natural rate of interest, delays in obtain-
ing reliable information could lead central banks to carry out inaccurate policies in
real time, as pointed out earlier in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) and recently
in Arestis and Sawyer (2008) and Neri and Ropele (2012). Accordingly, the unobserv-
ability of the natural rate of interest, the lags in obtaining precise information and
other drawbacks have led many authors to question its usefulness for the accuracy
of the monetary policy, as asserted by2 Clark and Kozicki (2005) and Weber, Lemke
and Worms (2008).
Nevertheless, and despite the di¢ culty of estimating the natural rate of interest,
its importance is decisive for policymakers since this variable is the element integrated
into the widely-used monetary rules which reects the information about changes in
the forces that guide the economy. Taylor and Williams (2010) analyze the optimal
1Other works focus on connected issues such as the relationship between money and the natural
rate of interest (Andres, Lopez-Salido and Nelson, 2009) and the impact of misunderstandings in
this rate on the zero lower bound of the nominal interest rates (Williams, 2009).
2Alternative but related research studies the e¤ects of mismeasurements of the output gap on
the optimal monetary policy, such as Orphanides et al. (2000), Rudebusch (2001), McCallum (2001),
Smets (2002) and Orphanides (2003), among others.
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monetary policy rules and conclude that the optimal coe¢ cients assigned to variables
such as the deviations of ination or the output gap change depending on the mis-
measurements in the natural rate of interest. Cúrdia et al. (2011) assert that the
optimal monetary policy rules have to integrate this rate and Canzoneri, Cumby and
Diba (2012) show how the rules perform better if the monetary authority can track
the natural rate of interest3.
Besides, some relevant information may be overlooked in the estimation process
or, as Arestis and Sawyer (2008) pointed out, the theoretical assumptions imposed
may not be valid. Amato (2005) indicates that some features of nancial markets,
such as the existence of external nance premiums or agency problems, may a¤ect
the natural rate of interest by generating a wedge between the actual long-term
interest rates and the long-term natural rate. In addition, as outlined in that work,
the literature has always assumed that the steady state ination is zero. However,
many studies such as Ascari (2004) and Cogley and Sbordone (2008), among others,
have proposed that trend ination is positive, in general, so the relaxation of this
assumption could shift the equilibrium and, thus, the natural rate of interest. Hence,
the denition of the natural rate should be modied. We can no longer understand it
as the rate that ensures price stability, but the rate which provides ination stability
around a long-term level.
The need to know the value of the natural rate of interest has led the empirical
literature to estimate it and to analyze the gap between this rate and the short-term
rate. These estimates go beyond simple historical averages as they are not precise,
particularly in periods of a high variability of output gap and ination. One of the
rst articles that address this issue is Bomm (1997), who derives the natural rate
of interest of the U.S. by assessing the IS and the potential output curves. Laubach
and Williams (2003) estimate the time-varying natural rate of interest for the U.S.,
3However, this nding depends on the framework employed because other approaches as Laxton
and Pesenti (2003) argue that ination-forecast-based rules perform better in small open economies.
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concluding that its underestimation worsens macro stabilization. Moreover, as also
noted by Tristani (2009), they suggest that, if the natural rate included in the Taylor
rule is not correctly estimated, the ination target is never achieved. But they do
not delve into the determination of the fundamentals of this rate nor go beyond the
mechanism which can be applied to verify whether the monetary authority is deviated
from the correct value. Other applied works are Mésonnier and Renne (2007), who
estimate the time-varying natural rate of interest for the euro zone, and Manrique and
Marques (2004), who do the same for the U.S. and Germany, both papers employing
the methodology of Laubach and Williams (2003).
The present paper carries out an analysis of the determination of the natural rate
of interest as well as of the impact of the wrong identication of this rate, emphasizing
the long-term perspective. The theoretical context is a modied New Keynesian
model with endogenous growth, nancial frictions and trend ination developed in
Olmos and Sanso (2014). Firstly, we obtain the steady state of the economy and
the expression for the natural rate of interest, identied as the long-run real interest
rate, which depends on the long-run growth rate and on the structure of the nancial
system. We conduct a sensitivity analysis of the natural interest rate to changes in
the parameters of the nancial sector, concluding how are the responses to shifts in
the nancial structure.
Furthermore, when the central bank inaccurately estimates the natural rate of
interest, its value depends on both the wrong value and the ination target. Under
this assumption, it follows that the value estimated for the natural rate of interest is
non-neutral to monetary policy. The reason is found not only in the gap generated
between the targeted and the actual long-run ination when the central bank mis-
understands the natural rate, as Tristani (2009) and Laubach and Williams (2003)
stated, but also in its inuence on the long-run growth rate.
Delving into the relationship between the long-run growth rate and the potential
error in the natural rate estimate, we prove that it depends on the ination target. As
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our model predicts that the long-term growth rate is maximized when the central bank
approaches a certain ination rate in the long run, this relationship will depend on
the di¤erential between this optimal ination rate and the ination target. We show
that the natural interest rate target can serve as a policy instrument. Specically,
we demonstrate that, in order to stimulate the long-term growth rate, if the ination
target is below the optimal one, the natural interest rate target should be lower than
the endogenous rate.
Finally, we develop a procedure to monitor the accuracy of the estimate of the
natural rate based on our conclusions to verify whether the central bank is wrong
and how to follow a path towards a more convenient or the true value.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical model used is
briey presented. Section 3 is devoted to displaying the steady state equations and
to introducing our denition of the natural rate of interest, submitting this rate to
a sensitivity analysis. Section 4 presents the impact on the economys trend that
mismeasurements of the natural rate of interest would trigger. In Section 5, we
design a procedure to verify and correct the deviations from the true value of this
rate. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main ndings.
2 Theoretical Model
The theoretical setup used to derive the natural rate of interest and its characteristics
is fully developed in Olmos and Sanso (2014) so, here, we briey present it in order
to detail the notation and the basic structure. It is an adaptation of the benchmark
New Keynesian DGSE model which incorporates spill-over e¤ects as the source of
economic growth. Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), nancial frictions have been
included and, nally, trend ination is allowed. The model considers the presence
of six types of agents in the economy: households, capital producers, intermediate
goods rms, nancial intermediaries, retail rms and the central bank.
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Households Households consume and use part of their savings to create deposits
in the nancial intermediaries. Each household has a fraction  of its members who
are bankers, who manage one nancial institution each and transfer the prots to
their households, and a fraction (1  ) who are workers, who produce goods and
earn the competitive wages. Their preferences are given by:
Et
1X
t=0
i
"
logCt+i   N
1+'
t+i
1 + '
#
(1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate, Nt the labor supply,  > 0 the relative
utility weight of labor, ' the intertemporal estasticity of labor supply and Ct the
consumption of nal good. The householdsbudget constraint is:
Ct +
Dt
Rt
= Dt 1 +  t +WtNt   Tt (2)
where Dt are one-period life deposits and public debt, Rt is the real gross interest
rate,  t are rmsprots, Wt is the real wage and Tt are lump sum taxes. The labor
supply and the Euler equation are:
Wt = CtN
'
t (3)
Ett;t+1Rt = 1 (4)
with
t;T = 
T t Ct
CT
where T = t+ 1 (5)
Intermediate goods rms Intermediate goods producers obtain their output by
using the capital acquired and the labor force hired from the households. These rms
have a common production function that yields economic growth following Romer
(1986):
Y ijt = e
ztKjt (KtNjt)
1  (6)
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Y ijt being the production obtained by rm j with j pertaining to the interval [0,1],
Kjt the capital stock and Njt the labor used. The index Kt =
R 1
0
Kjtdj represents
the stock of knowledge generated by capital accumulation by all the intemediate
producers, taken as given by rms. zt is the AR(1) productivity shock common to
all rms. Aggregating the rmsproduction functions and assuming that they are all
identical:
Y it = e
ztKtN
1 
t (7)
Furthermore, goods producers fund capital purchases by issuing nancial claims
(St) at a price Qt:
QtSt = QtKt+1 (8)
Denoting by P it the price of the intermediate good and  the depreciation rate,
the wage that minimizes costs and the capital return (Rqt ) are:
Wt = P
i
t (1  )
Y it
Nt
(9)
Et

Rqt+1
	
=
P it+1Y
i
t+1
Kt+1
+Qt+1   
Qt
(10)
Capital producers We dene the capital accumulation, a¤ected by adjustment
costs, as follows:
Kt+1 = Kt + I
n
t (11)
where Int = It   Kt is the net investment and It the gross investment. Capital
producers refurbish depreciated capital adquired from intermediate goods producers
and resell it, along with newly-created capital, to goods producers. The solution to
the investment problem, common to all capital producers, leads to the relative price:
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Qt = 1 + f +
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
f 0   Ett;t+1

Int+1 + I
k
Int + I
k
2
f 0 (12)
where In;kt =
Int
Kt
, Ik = I
K
is the value of gross investment relative to capital in the
state steady and t;t+1 is the discount rate derived from the householdsdecision.
Retail rms These rms make use of intermediate goods, transforming them into
di¤erentiated nal goods following the Dixit-Stiglitz technology. In order to include
nominal rigidities, we follow the model of Calvo (1983). If we abandon the zero trend
ination assumption and dene Xt =
P t
Pt
and Pt
Pt+i
= 1Qi
k=1 t+k
, Pt being the nal good
price index, P t the optimal price in t and t the gross ination rate, the equations
related to xing prices are:
Xt = 
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k

Yt+iP
i
t+i
Et
P1
i=0 
it;t+i
Qi
k=1t+k
 1
Yt+i
(13)
Xt =

1  
1   1t
 1
 1
(14)
where  is the probability of not changing the price,  = 
 1 is the mark-up of
the retailers and  is the parameter of the aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz index.
Financial intermediaries The structure of our nancial market follows the ap-
proach of Gertler and Karadi (2011). Financial intermediaries raise funds from house-
holds remunerated at Rt+1 and lend them to intermediate goods rms yielding a rate
Rqt+1. Their objective function maximizes their expected wealth (Vft):
Vft = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i
 
Rqt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSft+i +Rt+1+iFft+i

(15)
where  is the probability of survival of the bankers and Fft is the net wealth held
by intermediary f at the end of period t. Financial intermediaries provide funds if
9
they do not obtain losses or, analogously, the discounted external nance premium
is greater than zero. Furthermore, the bankers have the chance to divert a fraction
 of the disposable funds to their households. But, if this happens, the depositors
could force the bankruptcy of the nancial intermediary and rescue the proportion
(1  ) of the available funds. Thus, the depositors are willing to lend their funds to
the bankers whenever the following equation holds:
htFft + vtQtSft  QtSft (16)
where vt is the marginal gain of bankers derived from expanding their assets
QtSft but maintaining the net wealth xed and ht is the expected value of having an
additional unit of Fft, supposing that Sft remains constant:
vt = Et

(1  ) t;t+1
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

+ t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1
	
(17)
ht = Et f(1  ) + t;t+1tt;t+1ht+1g (18)
where xt;t+i =
Qt+iSft+i
QtSft
and tt;t+i =
Fft+i
Fft
are the growth rates of assets and wealth,
respectively. Hence, the total funding that banks can obtain depends on their wealth:
QtSft =
ht
  vtFft = 
p
tFft (19)
with pt being the private leverage ratio. We dene the bankers wealth as follows:
Fft+1 =
 
Rqt+1  Rt+1

pt +Rt+1

Fft (20)
Given that the bankstotal wealth is independent of rm-specic factors, we can
aggregate it to obtain:
QtSt = 
p
tFt (21)
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Distinguishing between the wealth of the new (F nt ) and the old (F
o
t ) bankers, and
given that the initial funds of the new bankers are dened as the ratio !
1  of the old
bankerswealth (1  )QtSt 1, the total wealth can be stated as:
Ft = F
o
t + F
n
t (22)
where
F ot = 

(Rqt  Rt)pt 1 +Rt

Ft 1 (23)
F nt = !QtSt 1 (24)
Central Bank The central bank implements monetary policy by setting the short-
term nominal interest rate (Rnt ) following a Taylor rule:
Rnt = R

t
e
t

t

  Yt
Y 
y
exp (t) (25)
whereRt is the time-varying natural rate of interest estimated by the central bank,
et is the expected ination rate, 
 is the steady state gross ination target, Y  is
the natural level of output consistent with , and ; y are the parameters that
measure the central banks reaction to ination and output deviations from its target
levels, respectively. The monetary policy shock t is an AR(1) process. Moreover, the
relationship between real and nominal interest rates is dened by the Fisher equation
Rnt = RtEtt+1.
We also contemplate the possibility that the central bank intermediates a small
part of the total claims (Scbt ) at priceQt carrying e¢ ciency costs  . In order to simplify
the model dynamics, but without ignoring the e¤ects that this kind of intermediation
could generate on the natural rate of interest, we consider that this proportion ( ) is
xed and corresponds to the steady state value. This lending mechanism is supported
by taxes and by issuing riskless debt acquired by households which is remunerated
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at the rate Rt, and yields R
q
t . Hence, the structure of the nancial intermediation of
the economy is fully described by the equation:
QtSt = 
p
tFt +  QtSt = 
T
t Ft (26)
with Tt =
1
1  
p
t being the leverage ratio of the economy.
Equilibrium The aggregate equilibrium of the economy is given by:
Yt = Ct + It + f
 
In;kt + I
k
In;kt 1 + Ik
!
(Int + I) +  QtKt+1 (27)
Finally, the total output of the economy is equivalent to the intermediate goods
rmsoutput weighted by the inverse of the price dispersion of the retailers (t):
Yt = Y
i
t
 1
t (28)
t+1 = 

t+1t + (1  )X t+1 (29)
3 The Natural Rate of Interest
In this section we introduce the equations that characterize the steady state and we
display the values of the parameters used in the calibration of the economy. Then,
we present the denition of the natural rate of interest that emerges from the model
developed, carrying out a sensitivity analysis in order to evaluate the shifts in this
rate induced by changes in the nancial parameters.
3.1 Steady State Equations
First of all, in order to nd a well-dened endogenous and stable steady state, we have
to normalize the growing variables. We choose the capital stock as the normalization
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variable because it is the source of economic growth, whose gross growth rate is
dened as Gt = KtKt 1 . All the normalized variables has the superscript k, whilst the
variables evaluated in the steady state have no subscript. Below we show the main
equations distinguishing among the di¤erent blocks of the model.
From households, intermediate goods producers, capital producers and retail rms,
we can obtain the following expressions:
CkN' = (1  ) X

1  
1   1N
  (30)
1
R
=

G
(31)
Rq = P iN1  + 1   (32)
X =

1  
1   1
 1
 1
(33)
P i =
X (1  )
 (1   1) (34)
From nancial intermediaries:
v = (1  )  (Rq  R) + tv (35)
h = (1  ) + th (36)
p =
h
  v (37)
t = (Rq  R)p +R (38)
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G =
1
1   
pF k (39)
F k =  [(Rq  R)p +R]F k + (1  )! (40)
And, from the equilibrium of the economy:
N1  (1  )
(1  )X  = C
k +G  (1  ) +  G (41)
In order to analyze the consequences of the incorrect estimate of the natural rate
of interest by the central bank, we contemplate the possibility of R 6= R, where R
is the endogenous natural rate of interest. Thus, the Taylor rule in the long run is
dened as follows:
Rn = R




(42)
To derive this expression, we have made use of the equivalence in the steady state
e = . Also, we have assumed Y = Y  but, for reasons given below, we can no
longer assume that  = . We should note that, if R = R, this expression is
reduced to the standard relationship at the steady state between real and nominal
interest rate, i.e. Rn = R.
Substituting the left-hand side of (42) by the Fisher equation:
R = R




(43)
Hence, the natural rate of interest in the steady state depends on the e¤ective
ination rate, but also on the targets (R;). Rearranging terms:
 = 

R
R
 1

(44)
Thus, we have endogeneized the e¤ective ination rate in the steady state, which
is now related to the ination target and the real interest rate deviation weighted by
14
the parameter of reaction to deviations in the ination rate included in the Taylor
rule. This expression, in logs, coincides with that indicated by Laubach and Williams
(2003):
 =  +
1

(r   r) (45)
Therefore, the long-run endogenous ination rate and the target rate will match
if and only if the central bank correctly estimates the natural rate of interest. This
nding is in accordance with the conclusion of Tristani (2009). From (44) and (31),
we obtain the expression:
 = 

G
R
 1

(46)
So the e¤ective steady state ination rate depends on the target of both ination
and the natural rate of interest, as well as on the long-term growth.
If we draw on (30) and (41), we can solve for G:
G =
1
1 +  

1  
(1  )X N
1    X (1  )	

N '  + (1  )

(47)
where  = (1   1) and 	 = (1  ).
Furthermore, from (35)-(38) we obtain that:
(Rq  R) =  (1  )  v
  v
Rv
(1  ) (48)
Now, relying on (31), (37), (39) and (40):
G =
(1  )!vR
(1   ) (Rq  R) (  v) 1   R
 v
 (49)
Replacing (48) in (49):
G =
(1  )2 !
(1   ) [ (1  )  v]
h
1  G


 v
i (50)
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From (31) and (32):
(Rq  R) = X	

N1  + (1  ) R (51)
Equating (48) and (51) taking into account (31):
N =


X	

1 +
[ (1  )  v] v
(  v)

G

  (1  )
 1
1 
(52)
And, introducing the last expression into (47):
G =
1
1 +  
(

X	
"
1  
(1  )X   
(1  )X	



	X
 (1+')
1 
#
+ (1  )
)
(53)
where  =
h
1 + [(1 ) v]v
(1 )( v)

G

  (1  )
i
.
Summing up, the steady state is determined by (50) and (53), along with the
expressions of the relative optimal price (33) and the e¤ective ination rate in the
steady state (46). These equations indicate that the equilibrium is determined by
the e¤ective steady state ination rate, which, in turn, coincides with its target if the
central bank correctly estimates of the natural rate. However, if R 6= R, the long-
term ination rate is determined not only by its target in the monetary policy rule
but also by the error in the real interest rate estimate through relationship (44). So,
if this constraint holds, the deviation in the estimation of the natural rate of interest
will be non-neutral in the long run, a key outcome in our analysis. In Section 5, we
delve into this question.
3.2 Calibration
The parameter values used in the calibration of the model are reported in Table 1
and correspond to the baseline model in Olmos and Sanso (2014). The values of
most conventional parameters are standard in the literature, the policy and nancial
parameter values are taken from Gertler and Karadi (2011), whilst the value of 
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is set so that the values of the long-run annual growth rate (2.5%), the annualized
external nance premium (1.17%) and the leverage ratio (4.8) are admissible for an
annual ination rate of 2.5%. Using these values, we nd the solution of equations
(50) and (53) in the plane fv;Gg once the expressions of X and  are substituted
from (33) and (46).
Table 1: Parameters values
Parameter Interpretation Value
 Discount Rate 0.99
 Participation of capital 0.332
 Depreciation Rate 0.03
 Relative utility weight of labor 14.1
 Probability of keeping prices xed 0.779
& Adjustment capital costs 5.85
 Survival rate of bankers 0.97
 Fraction of capital that can be diverted 0.382
! Proportional transfer to new bankers 0.002
' Elasticity of labor supply 0.276
 Elasticity of substitution 4.167
 Coe¢ cient of ination in the Taylor rule 2.05
y Coe¢ cient of output gap in the Taylor rule 0.5/4
z Technology shock persistence 0.9
e Monetary shock persistence 0.5
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3.3 Denition of the Natural Rate of Interest
According to (31), the endogenous natural rate of interest depends on the long-run
growth rate of the economy4, which, in turn, depends on the nancial parameters
from (50) and on the e¤ective steady state ination rate from (53). From these three
expressions we can write:
R =
(1  )2 !
(1   ) [ (1  )  v]    G
 v
 =
=
1
(1   )
(

X	
"
1  
(1  )X   
(1  )X	



	X
 (1+')
1 
#
+ (1  )
)
(54)
Hence, in this type of models with nancial frictions, the natural rate of interest
depends on the structure of the nancial sector5 as in the denition proposed by De
Fiore and Tristani (2011), even assuming that the central bank correctly estimates it.
Moreover, if the central bank does not match the long-term interest rate estimate with
the endogenous one, this rate will also depend on the monetary policy parameters
(; R; ) because the efective long-run ination is a function of these values as has
been shown in (46). This nding leads us to maintain that, assuming R 6= R, the
deviations a¤ect the value of the e¤ective natural rate and the steady state ination
rate.
We now explore the relationships among the nancial parameters and the natural
rate of interest assuming R = R since di¤erences among alternative scenarios in
terms of magnitude are mild. The natural rate of interest and the steady state
4This result contradicts the nding of Weber, Lemke and Worms (2008), who argue that there
is no a desirable level for the natural rate. Clark and Kozicki (2005) also empirically analyze the
link between this rate and the long-run growth rate and conclude that it is weak.
5In line with this result, previous works such as Borio, Disyatat and Juselius (2013) support the
inclusion of nancial variables in the denition of long-run references such as the potential output.
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growth rate are positively related, so all parameter changes that increase the natural
rate of interest also stimulate the long-term growth rate.
Figure 1: Endogenous natural rate of interest and nancial parameters if  = 2:5%
First, we analyze the e¤ects of shifts in the nancial parameters ; ; ! and, then,
the e¤ects of variations in the steady-state unconventional monetary policy parame-
ters  ;  . Figure 1 displays the results for the annualized natural rate of interest. The
rst plot shows how the natural rate drops when the funds that bankers can divert
increase. This means that, when the nancial system prots can be diverted away
and not reinvested, the trend of the depositsyield o¤ered by nancial intermediaries
is smaller. Meanwhile, the e¤ects of increments in the survival rate of the bankers
and in the funds with which the new bankers start on the natural rate of interest are
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positive. The lower the rotation of the intermediaries in the nancial system and the
more funds the new nancial intermediaries own, the higher the risk-free rate of re-
turn in the steady state. The most prominent result is perhaps the e¤ect of a change
in , given that it indicates that the renovation of the intermediaries is not positive
for the natural interest rate and, consequently, for the long-run economic growth.
As regards the unconventional monetary policy parameters, both e¢ ciency costs
and the proportion of the credit policy in the steady state increase the endogenous
natural rate of interest. The rst parameter weakly a¤ects the natural rate of interest,
while the more funds the central bank intermediates in the steady state, the greater
the natural rate of interest.
3.4 Stabilization
As discussed above, some previous work, such as Orphanides and Williams (2002),
reveals that the cost of underestimating the natural rate of interest in terms of eco-
nomic stabilization is greater than the cost of overestimating it. In order to assess
the stabilization costs of potential estimation errors of the natural rate of interest,
we have submitted the model to the standard types of perturbations, a monetary
policy shock and a technological shock. We have considered three possible scenarios
corresponding to R < R, R = R and R > R. Under the two kind of shocks, the re-
sponses of the variable do not depend on the accuracy of the estimation of the natural
rate6. Therefore, our results do not support the nding of, among others, Orphanides
and Williams (2002), because the e¤ects of the errors are undi¤erentiated, at least for
this sort of perturbations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these e¤ects are not
signicant on the trend, since the values around which these deviations are obtained
change depending on the di¤erent assumptions about the errors. We delve into this
issue in the next section.
6We do not display the plots because the response variable is standard and indistinguishable
among scenarios.
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4 Steady State E¤ects
In this section we evaluate the impact of errors in the estimation of the natural rate of
interest on the trend of the economy, focusing on the e¤ects on economic growth and
examining their impact on the marginal gain of banks and on the gap between the
e¤ective and the targeted ination. To obtain a complete perspective, we will asses
the equilibrium value of our key variables for a wide range of the di¤erential (R R)
and the ination rate target. We should note that the value of R is endogenously
xed by (31), so we modify the value of the interest rate di¤erential by adjusting the
interest rate targeted by the central bank.
Firstly, we analyze the e¤ect of the di¤erential (R  R) on the long-run economic
growth rate. As shown in Figure 2, where all variables are expressed in annualized
rates, the behavior depends on . We can distinguish two di¤erentiated types of
e¤ects. The rst for values of  below 1.7% (the rate which provides the maximum
steady state growth, denoted as op and represented by the black line) and the second
for higher rates. The cause of the existence of this specic threshold is evidenced in
Olmos and Sanso (2014), since  = op = 1:7% is the rate at which the long-run
growth rate is maximized in the absence of estimation errors, as shown in the vertical
axis points (when R = R). In this particular case, satisfying  = op, the behavior
is symmetrical around the maximum when R = R for the two scenarios R < R and
R > R.
When the ination rate target is below op, economic growth decreases when
R > R, so the overestimation of the natural interest rate (right-hand side of the
graph) discourages the long-run growth rate. For example, if  = 0% and R exceeds
the natural rate by 200 basis points, equilibrium growth decreases more than 0.015
percentage points with respect to the scenario R = R. This long-term conclusion
under the assumption  = 0% is in line with the short-term nding of Laubach and
Williams (2003), who dened the monetary policy as contractionary when the real
rate of interest is above the natural rate.
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Figure 2: Annual growth and interest rate di¤erential
On the other hand, if  > op, the underestimation of the natural rate of interest
has a negative e¤ect on the long-term growth rate. If  = 4%, the growth rate
decreases 0.03 percentage points whenR is 200 basis points belowR. It is noteworthy
that such di¤erences are accentuated the farther away the central bank is from the
optimal ination.
However, we underline that, when the natural rate of interest is underestimated
and  < op or is overestimated and  > op, the conclusions are not univocal.
In these scenarios the relationship between (R  R) and G is hump-shaped. This
can be explained by the fact that, for any ination target, when R 6= R there is an
attainable maximum value for the long-run growth rate, which is almost identical to
that corresponding to the case of R = R and  = op but slightly lower. These
maximum steady-state growth points are located on the left-hand side where R < R
for  < op and on the right-hand side where R > R for  > op. Moreover, the
relationship between (R  R) and G approximates the scenario R = R the closer
the ination target is to the optimal rate.
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Secondly, in Figure 3, we explore the relationship between the marginal gain of the
nancial intermediaries from expanding their assets and the interest rate di¤erential
(R  R). As in the previous exercise, the results depend on the ination target
although, in this case, the direction is the opposite due to the negative relationship7
between G and v. When the ination target does not overcome threshold op, the
expected earnings of the nancial system, which depend on the steady state external
nance premium (Rq  R), rise if R > R. Contrarily, when  > op, the nancial
gain increases if R < R and, for the particular case of  = op, the behavior is
symmetric around the minimum when R = R. Analogously to the case of G, for the
scenarios ( < op; R < R) and (R > R; > op), the relationship has a mixed
behavior because it is U-shaped.
Figure 3: Marginal gain and interest rate di¤erential
Finally, the ination rate di¤erential is studied in Figure 4. In this case,  is
xed and set by the monetary authority whilst  is endogenously determined by (46).
When R = R, the di¤erential is zero, when R < R, it is positive and, when R > R,
7This relationship is non-linear although, for reasonable levels of trend ination, it is negative.
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it is negative. Thus, the di¤erentials (  ) and (R  R) have a negative linear
relationship across the whole range, disclosing a very slight di¤erence for any .
Figure 4: Ination di¤erential and interest rate di¤erential
The interpretation of these results suggests that, when the ination target is
below the optimal rate, a lax monetary policy that reduces R stimulates the long-
run growth rate because the e¤ective ination rate in the steady state approaches
the optimal ination rate up to a threshold value. By contrast, for high levels of the
ination target ( > op), a contractionary monetary policy (R > R) leads to an
actual long-term ination closer to the optimum, again up to a limit, so the growth
rate increases. Therefore, if the central bank wants to stimulate the long-run growth,
monetary policy must always reduce the long-term ination gap jop   j. This can
be implemented in two di¤erent ways. The rst, as we have seen, by modifying the
estimate of the natural rate of interest. This policy will not be useful when R < R
and  < op or when R > R and  > op.
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Figure 5: Growth and 
But the objective of increasing the long-run growth rate can also be reached
through the parameter of the Taylor rule that reacts to deviations of ination, .
Although the central bank interprets this parameter as a regulator of the short and
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medium-term nominal interest rate, if the estimated natural rate of interest does not
match the endogenous one, it will also inuence the long-run growth rate according to
(46), which is a prominent result of our work. In order to analyze this relationship,
we now again assume three scenarios, R < R, R = R and R > R, setting the
di¤erence between interest rates (R  R) at 200 basis points above and below 0 and
changing the value of the parameter  to observe the e¤ects. As shown in Figure
5, the e¤ects of shifts in  depend on both the ination target and the di¤erential
(R  R). If R < R, an increase in  triggers a reduction of the long-run growth
rate if and only if the ination target is below 1%. However, if the ination target
is higher than 1%, the relationship is positive. If, instead, the central bank sets a
long-run interest rate equal to the endogenous value, there are no di¤erences in the
growth rate for any variation of  regardless of the value of 
. But, if R > R,
the long-run growth rate decreases with  for higher ination targets than 3% and
increases with lower ones.
This section contains a wealthy set of conclusions about the many di¤erent sit-
uations that could be taking place in the long run. The necessary information to
know where an economy is situated will be of a great importance for reaching the
objectives of the monetary policy. In the following section we use these results in
order to identify where is the economy in a given point of time.
5 Verication
Although the exact knowledge of the natural rate of interest in real time is a challeng-
ing task, some of the conclusions drawn from our analysis could assist the monetary
authorities in this objective. With the exercise we propose in this section, the central
bank would be able to nd out both its monetary policy stance regarding the ination
rate that maximizes long-run growth and the accuracy of the estimate of the natural
rate of interest. In this way, monetary authorities could monitor the performance of
26
monetary policy in relation to long-term growth.
To clarify the iterative mechanism we have designed, in Figure 6 we propose a
stylized outline of Figure 2.
Figure 6: Verication process. The long run
Let us suppose that the central bank is located at an unknown point of Figure
6 in which the only known long-run variables are the targets included in the mon-
etary policy rule (; R). There are two possible strategies; the rst is the aim of
maximizing the long-term growth rate and the second widens this goal by including
the correct estimate of the natural rate of interest. Below, we describe the steps
required to achieve both goals. We study the changes in the steady state that would
generate the modication of some policy tools and, then, we provide some guidelines
for interpreting the transition path in the short term.
Maximizing G The success of the rst strategy is very straightforward to achieve.
The central bank only has to move the estimate of the natural rate of interest until
the long-run growth rate stops increasing. Assuming8 that  6= op, there are six
8Otherwise the procedure would be the same.
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possible types of initial points (A, B, C, D, E, F), marked on Figure 6, and two op-
timal nal points depending on whether  < op or  > op. The direction of the
correct shifts of R depends on the position of the initial point with respect to the
global maximum located at a specic value of (R  R), which di¤ers for each of the
displayed ination targets. As the central bank does not possess this information,
the rst movement tests the proper adjustment of R and the subsequent changes
iteratively modify R up to the maximum long-run growth rate in the direction in-
dicated by the arrows. To illustrate this method, let us assume that the initial point
is ( = 0%;R = 4:5%). The aim of the central bank is to maximize G, but it does
not know either op or R. Keeping  constant, the rst random move of the poli-
cymaker might be to increase R, but this would bring down G. Hence, the central
bank has ascertained that it has to reduce R in order to increase G, though it still
does not know if the starting point was C, D or E. This process will make G reach
its maximum at the point ( = 0%;R = 3%).
This exercise would be simple if G were known. Unfortunately, monetary au-
thorities do not know the long-term growth rate exactly, but they perform estimates
based on provisional information. Therefore, we now relax the assumption of the
correct knowing9 of G and we suppose that the central bank can only perceive the
direction of changes in Gt, that is, the short-run growth rate. Although some authors
such as Orphanides and Van Norden (2002) have criticized the condence of real-time
calculations, we consider that this assumption is not unreasonable.
Above, we have computed the steady state values of the endogenous variables for
the di¤erent levels of (R  R), so the exercise now builds on the evaluation of the
transition path between scenarios in the absence of other shocks. In order to do this,
9Much academic literature has empirically addressed related issues with di¤erent perspectives,
such as the estimation of the potential output and its trend as in Edge et al. (2007). There are some
earlier works, such as Kuttner (1994), that suppose this rate is constant, but later works suppose
a time-varying rate as in Laubach and Williams (2003), who jointly estimate the natural rate of
interest and the trend growth rate.
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we propose a simulation in which a permanent change in the estimate of the natural
rate of interest is imposed. Thus, our model loses its stochastic quality, which is
explained by the anticipated nature of this kind of alteration of the model.
Figure 7: Verication process. The short run I
As in the previous example, we suppose that the initial target is  = 0%, the case
of the blue line in Figure 6. Figure 7a displays the response of Gt across 20 quarters
to a change in R. As expected, when the central bank reduces the intercept in the
Taylor rule from 4.5% to 3.5%, the short-term growth rate increases. Conversely, if
the central bank raises the natural rate estimate from 3.5% to 4.5%, the growth rate
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diminishes after some periods. However, this consequence is valid if and only if the
estimate of the natural rate is above the rate that ensures the maximum long-run
growth rate (points10 C, D and E in Figure 6), which corresponds to R = 3% when
 = 0%. If, for instance, the central bank raises the estimate from R = 1:5% to
R = 2:5% (point F), Gt does not decrease but, as can be seen in the solid line in
Figure 7a, increases. Analogously, a change from R = 2:5% to R = 1:5% causes a
drop in Gt.
The conclusions are the same if the target ination rate exceeds the optimal rate.
Figure 7b shows the transition path of the short-term growth rate between steady
states if  = 3%. As in the previous simulation, Gt increases when the central
bank approximates to the estimate of the natural rate that maximizes G (in this case
R = 9%) and decreases otherwise.
Therefore, even if both the optimal ination rate and the natural rate of interest
were unknown, central banks would have a tool that allows them to maximize the
long-term growth rate through the modication of the intercept in the Taylor rule.
Maximizing G and reaching R = R The second strategy, which includes the
reaching of the maximum long-term growth and the correct estimate of R, requires a
multiple-step process. Firstly, the policymaker has to move  to assess the sign of
the di¤erential (R  R). Figure 8a plots the responses of the short-term growth rate
to a decrease in  from  = 2:05 to  = 1:6 for several combinations of 
 and R.
Figure 5 showed that the shifts in the long-run growth rate from a modication in
 depend on both (R
  R) and (   op). However, in the short-term horizon, Gt
rises when  decreases if and only if R
 < R whatever the value of  and vice versa.
Given that R approaches 6:5% for both levels of  considered, the state R < R
is represented in Figure 8a by the solid lines and R > R by dashed lines11. The
10We include point C because the central bank does not know op.
11For the sake of clarity, we have shown only these cases, although the behavior described holds
for all other scenarios.
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justication is based on that, as long as  penalizes deviations in t from 
, its
reduction means a more expansive policy which enhances the short-term growth rate
if and only if the intercept set in the Taylor rule does not constrain the monetary
policy or, equivalently, if R < R. Thus, if Gt rises when  increases, the central
bank can discard, following Figure 6, points B, C and D.
Figure 7: Verication process. The short run II
At this point, the central bank has the information derived from the rst step
of this mechanism about the sign of (R  R). Once this information is known,
policymakers have to move R until arriving to the R = R scenario, that is, when
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Gt does not change when  varies. In our example, where 
 = 0%, this happens
when R = R = 6:5%.
If the central bank additionally wants to maximize G, shifts in  will reveal the
sign of (   op). As shown in Figure 8b, and supposing that the starting ination
target is 1%, if the central bank lowers  to zero and Gt decreases, this means that
 < op, so the achieving of the double goal involves the increase of  until Gt
stops growing, that is, when  = 1:7%.
Hence, policymakers have all the information required to approach the desirable
long-run equilibrium. The possibilities shown in this exercise can, therefore, provide
the central banks with enough information to achieve their goals and to adjust the
precision of its estimate of the natural rate of interest.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed, from a monetary policy point of view, the role of the
natural rate of interest in a New Keynesian model with endogenous growth, nancial
frictions and trend ination. First, we have introduced the DSGE model and we have
delved into the steady state obtaining a denition of the natural interest rate. We
have shown that this rate depends on the nancial structure and have carried out a
sensitivity analysis to determine the nature of this dependence. Furthermore, if the
central bank does not use the correct natural rate of interest in the monetary policy
rule, the long-term ination rate does not match the target. As a result, the natural
rate of interest becomes dependent on the monetary policy in two ways, since it is
sensitive to its own estimate error and to the ination target.
As regards the short-term economic stabilization, we have analyzed a monetary
and a technology shock and have found that the errors in the natural rate used in
the monetary policy rule do no a¤ect the responses of the variables and that there is
no asymmetry between under- and over-estimation.
32
Moreover, we have determined the relationship between the potential errors in the
estimation of the natural rate and the long-run growth rate. We have proved that
this relationship depends on the ination target because, if it is below (above) the
optimal long-run ination rate, long-term growth decreases when the estimation of
the natural rate is above (below) the endogenous one. The opposite happens with
the relationship between the marginal gain for expanding the assets of the banks and
the error in the estimation. However, in the other possible scenarios, the relationship
is hump-shaped, so the conclusions are not univocal. Furthermore, the parameter
included in the Taylor rule that reacts to deviations of ination in the short term
will also generate shifts in the long-run growth if the natural rate estimate is not
the endogenous one. Therefore, we can conclude that, according to these results, the
errors in the estimation of the natural rate of interest are not neutral in the long run.
Finally, on the basis of our results, we have developed a mechanism to verify
the stance of the monetary policy with respect to the optimal ination from the
growth perspective and the accuracy of the natural rate estimation, which can lead
to maximizing the long-run growth. The central bank has to nd out the sign of
the di¤erential between the estimated and the endogenous natural rate of interest
as well as the position of the ination target with respect to the rate that maximize
the long-run growth. The monetary authority rst makes use of the parameter that
reacts to ination deviations in the monetary policy rule. Then, by modifying the
intercept of the Taylor rule and the ination target, the central bank will be able to
determine the position of both the ination target with respect to the optimal rate
and the estimated natural rate of interest with respect to the endogenous one.
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